This is not a work, however, that is going to satisfy entirely the rigorous political scientist. For example, Rollin sometimes overplays his own role, particularly in legislative initiatives such as the passage of the 1985 Animal Welfare Act. Moreover, he also, I think, exaggerates the strength of that statute which, as he recognizes, does not stipulate—unlike, for instance, the equivalent British law—that all experimental procedures conducted using animals must be subject to a cost-benefit analysis before being approved. The limited enforcement of the legislation, too, is largely ignored.

What is striking, and shocking, about Rollin's account of the attitude of scientists (covered mainly in chapter 12 of the book) is their traditional reluctance to dispense with an ideology that doubts that animals are conscious and aware beings and therefore worthy of any moral concern. If anything, the change Rollin describes, and has helped shape, represents the emergence of an ethic that recognizes that animals have moral standing because they are sentient and, as a result, that we should avoid inflicting unnecessary suffering on them. This is at odds with Rollin's claim that there has been a shift to an animal rights agenda. What has changed over the past thirty years or so, I would argue, is that the definition of unnecessary has shifted, so that, for instance, it is no longer regarded as necessary by many to test cosmetics on animals or to kill animals for their fur. An animal rights ethic would go much further, and much further than would be currently acceptable to the majority. There are, it seems to me, real problems, for instance, in justifying the use of animals in most scientific experiments even from the perspective of Rollin's more nuanced animal rights position.

Despite these concerns, this is a book that can be highly recommended to anyone who wants an introductory account of the key issues in the increasingly important debate about our treatment of animals. It serves as a powerful testament to a life devoted to improving their lives and deaths.

–Robert Garner

SOME BUILT IT; ALMOST ALL LET IT BE

Catherine D. Chatterley: *Disenchantment: George Steiner and the Meaning of Western Civilization after Auschwitz*. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011. Pp. xii, 186. $24.95.)

Deborah E. Lipstadt: *The Eichmann Trial*. (New York: Schocken Books, 2011. Pp. xxvii, 237. $24.95.)

doi:10.1017/S0034670512000162

George Steiner, the twentieth-century Renaissance man, philosopher, literary critic, and novelist, offers us a sharp contrast to Adolf Eichmann, the

twentieth-century archcriminal, anti-Semite, prevaricator, and perpetrator of genocide. Yet one cataclysmic tragedy, the Holocaust of European Jews, links the lives of these two individuals together and provides both before and after this calamity a framework with which we can examine the history of this period. Needless to say, the Holocaust affected and circumscribed their lives, but in different ways. Steiner, the son of assimilated Austrian Jewish parents, as a youth in 1940 escaped the Holocaust by fleeing Europe with his parents to the United States where the family remained even after the war. Nevertheless, according to Catherine D. Chatterley, Steiner is a "kind of survivor" both as a European Jew who "escaped death in the Holocaust" and as one whose entire scholarly purview and oeuvre reflected "the central European Jewish world destroyed by the Shoah" (59). Steiner also gradually grew to acknowledge that the Holocaust and its aftermath must alone provide the central lens through which one can view and critique Western culture. By contrast, Eichmann, the son of German-Lutheran parents, joining the Nazi Party in 1932 and the SS soon thereafter, then rising through its ranks to become an SS lieutenant colonel, made his name by perfecting the forced emigration of Jews from Austria. Later, by leading the Gestapo's Jewish Affairs division within the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* (Reich Main Security Administration, or RSHA)—a role that enabled him to oversee the deportation of Jews from numerous occupied countries including Hungary—Eichmann secured an even more infamous name for carrying out such ruthlessness with lethal efficiency. Historians Catherine D. Chatterley and Deborah E. Lipstadt set in view the impact of the Holocaust on Steiner and Eichmann respectively as the former grapples with the meaning of the Holocaust in light of Western civilization and as the latter accounts for his pivotal role in its implementation and execution.

Catherine Chatterley has studied the place of the Holocaust in the writings of George Steiner for a long while, first as a Master's student at Concordia where she made this topic the subject of her 1997 thesis, and again as a doctoral student at the University of Chicago, where she further explored the implication of the Holocaust for Steiner's work in her 2007 dissertation. In *Disenchantment*, a revision of her University of Chicago dissertation, Chatterley seeks "to describe and explain the trajectory of Steinerian thought on the Holocaust and its relationship to Western culture … by connecting Steiner's evolving conception of the Holocaust and his theoretical understanding of antisemitism to his larger analysis of Western culture" (6). Drawing heavily on Steiner's 1997 memoir *Errata: An Examined Life* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson), along with articles written by Steiner's students and contemporaries, Chatterley first succinctly but eloquently introduces the reader to Steiner's biography. In particular, one learns about the centrality of Steiner's father, Frederick, in his son's life, ensuring that George would be a true humanist, immersed in the literature, art, music, and philosophy of European society. Though certainly aware of his Jewish heritage and its history, he was not an observant Jew. As a young man whose family

escaped the Holocaust, Steiner still faced his share of anti-Semitism, especially in academia. Steiner recalls how during his Yale freshman orientation in September 1947 he quickly learned that Jews were "consigned to a ghetto of pinched politeness" (13). Though he fared better at the University of Chicago and Harvard, his time at Oxford would reacquaint him with anti-Semitism and ostracism. In reality, Steiner's intellectual gifts, multiple linguistic abilities, and mastery of numerous academic disciplines never endeared him to many of his jealous colleagues. After a successful and rewarding time at Princeton University, Steiner endured the wrath of jealousy from his colleagues who refused to allow him to direct graduate students at Cambridge University, where he served as director of English studies at Churchill College from 1962 to 1969. In addition to their jealousy, Steiner's insistence on the importance of coming to terms with the Holocaust and its aftermath, especially in England, became an impediment for his full inclusion both there and at Oxford. As Chatterley rightly concludes, Steiner was a "pioneer" with such thinking.

Chatterley convincingly shows that Steiner did not always place the Holocaust in so central a position. In his first published work, "Malice," for which he won the 1952 Oxford University's Chancellor's English Essay prize, Steiner placed the murder of European Jews during World War II alongside other atrocities in history, though he acknowledged that it was perhaps "'more refined and horrible' in the long story of human evil" (27). Not until 1966 did Steiner centrally address the Holocaust in his essay "Postscript," in which he recounted his experience of reading *Scroll of Agony: The Warsaw Diary of Chaim Kaplan* (Hamilton, 1966) and Jean François Steiner's *Treblinka* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967). Steiner comments, "Treblinka *is* both because some men have built it and almost all other men let it be" (62). Soon thereafter, Steiner began seeking greater understanding for the Holocaust's origins. Firmly believing that historians had not truly addressed this point, Steiner took a multidisciplinary approach to the question that he believed was ultimately rooted in anti-Semitism. For Steiner, it was Christian society's inability to come to terms with the Jewish people's creation of "three separate systems of human perfectibility by which they are perceived to blackmail humanity: Mosaic monotheism, Christianity, and Marxism," which ultimately led to an annihilative hatred of Jews (67). He termed this process "the blackmail of transcendence." By the late 1980s, further reflection led Steiner to lessen "the blackmail of transcendence" theory and to posit a new one concerning the "relationship between the Jewish denial of Jesus and Christian antisemitism" (110)—a theory that became real with the implementation of the Holocaust.

Steiner also saw a relationship between the adulteration of language and the impetus to genocide. As early as 1959, in his essay "The Hollow Miracle," Steiner expressed this theory when he began to postulate a debasement in the German language, one he attributed to the intrusion of

"nationalism and the imposition of Prussian authority" with the onset of German unification (34). This situation enabled a permanent disfigurement of the German language and, ultimately, society and culture. In 1981, Steiner further developed this thinking in his novel *The Portage to San Cristobal of A. H.* (Faber and Faber), in which he drew "attention precisely to the terrible ambiguity of all language, in all speech acts … [by trying] to show that in Hitler's language there was anti-matter, anti-language, that which is transcendentally annihilating of truth and meaning. And that it had to clash with Judaism, which is a faith, a culture, a trust based perhaps excessively on the word, on the articulacy and possibility of meaning and on constant discourse even with God" (84). For Steiner, it is only when the German language is turned "against itself" and purified by "expunging its Nazi residue" that the language may be redeemed (113). Steiner cites the poetry of Holocaust survivor Paul Celan as an example of such expunction and purification.

Chatterley concludes that Steiner's understanding of the centrality of the Holocaust to Western civilization evolves alongside the emergence of Holocaust studies. Likewise, she concludes that "Steiner's work is transformed into an act of solidarity with all Jewish victims of the Shoah" (130). Chatterley has clearly shown this evolution in her work. However, what is often missing is the important connection with contemporary historiography on the Holocaust. Chatterley makes a case for the importance of Steiner's thought, but ultimately lacks the correlated evidence to support such claims. Similarly, the author relies primarily on Steiner's published work without any use of archival sources. If the author has conducted such archival research, the evidence of it is not present in the text. Thus Chatterley does show that George Steiner is an "important international interlocutor of the postwar period, especially for his principled interrogation of post-Holocaust Western culture and its Christian heritage" (134); however, further research and study will need to be undertaken to reveal whether Steiner in his teaching and writing was an innovator or a follower in the study of the impact of the Holocaust on Western civilization.

In her work *The Eichmann Trial*, Deborah E. Lipstadt examines anew the Israeli government's capture and trial of Adolf Eichmann fifty years after the trial took place. As her introduction attests, Lipstadt comes to this topic after an arduous trial of her own in Great Britain as defendant against the notorious Holocaust denier David Irving. As she comments toward the middle of her work, "Comparisons between these two men [Irving and Eichmann] are, of course, limited. It is one thing to trample on the truth, and quite another to trample on human lives as Eichmann did. Yet, ultimately, there is a link between those who perpetrated these horrors and those who deny them" (129). However, such comparison in no way dominates this concise and well-crafted study, based primarily on the trial transcripts and secondary works.

According to Lipstadt, Eichmann's trial not only brought him to justice but permanently solidified the word *Holocaust* to mean the murder of six million Jews during the Second World War. Likewise, the telling of the story, especially through eyewitness accounts from survivors, made the hearing of it entirely new. The trial also enabled an "accelerated" growth of Holocaust studies to take place and capacitated the creation of an "increasingly hospitable atmosphere" for survivors to share their stories (188, 200). In addition, the trial made it categorically clear that there is "universal jurisdiction over genocide," a precedent that ensured that "genocidal killers cannot take refuge behind claims of obedience to superior orders" (189).

Lipstadt opens her work with a discussion of Eichmann's capture, giving significant attention to the contemporary debate both within and outside Israel over whether the Israeli government had exceeded its rights in capturing Eichmann and putting him on trial. Lipstadt offers a critical portrait of those individuals and groups, such as the American Jewish Committee, who urged for an international tribunal outside of Israel and/or endeavored to refocus the trial on crimes against humanity in contrast to crimes against Jews, specifically in order to alleviate any "doubts about Jews' loyalty to America" (32). Lipstadt justifiably concludes her first chapter by stating, "Long before the court was called to order, it was evident that, in addition to Adolf Eichmann's crimes, many other issues would be in the docket" (36).

Gideon Hausner, Israel's attorney general, though far from a criminal lawyer or even a trial lawyer, took on the daunting role of chief prosecutor. At times, Hausner encountered problems with the three experienced judges, Moshe Landau, Benjamin Halevi, and Yitzhak Raveh, for making his case far broader in scope to encompass the entirety of the Holocaust rather than the specific crimes of Eichmann. The strategy, Lipstadt deduces, gave "a voice to the victims that they had not had before and would compel the world to listen to the story of the Final Solution in a way that it never had before" (55).

The Eichmann trial raised many questions central to Holocaust studies. Lipstadt shows how attuned Hausner was to such concerns and successfully utilized survivor testimony to address them. For example, in response to the question of Jewish resistance—a question under great debate in Israel at the time, especially among Israelis who had fought in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and in the conflicts of the following decade—Hausner had Holocaust survivor Moshe Beisky testify. When questioned about why he and others did not resist, Beisky replied, "I cannot describe this … terror inspiring fear. … Nearby us there was a Polish camp. There were 1,000 Poles. … One hundred meters beyond the camp they had a place to go to—their home. I don't recall one instance of escape on the part of the Poles. But where could any of the Jews go? We were wearing clothes which … were dyed yellow with yellow stripes. … To go beyond the boundaries of the camp—where would they go? What could they do?" (80–81). Similarly, the trial revealed the centrality and persistence of anti-Semitism in Germany when

Pastor Dr. Heinrich Gruber of Berlin testified about the "thick file" of "threatening and insulting letters" he had received from his fellow countrymen when it was announced that he would testify at the trial (89). Throughout the work, Lipstadt faultlessly and judiciously continues to choose such pertinent quotes from the transcripts to reinforce her narration.

When it comes to Eichmann, Lipstadt emphasizes his predictability. His lawyer, Robert Servatius, a veteran of the Nuremberg trials whose $35,000 salary to defend Eichmann the Israeli government paid, had his defendant fall back on the tactics of citing his superiors and the imperative of following orders and blaming faulty memory. Hausner's cross-examination of Eichmann produced only long, contradictory, and at times inarticulate responses, but never a confession. However, the prosecutor did easily produce enough evidence to incriminate Eichmann and debunk the claim that he could not remember certain facts. The final questioning by the three presiding judges accorded by Israeli law to ensure correct understanding of testimony did reveal that Eichmann "understood the implications of what he was doing but continued to obey his orders nonetheless" (131). This fact alone sealed his conviction.

Lipstadt reveals that not everyone agreed with the death sentence. Indeed, even a survivor questioned and appealed such a ruling. As Schmuel Hugo Bergmann, a professor of philosophy and an organizer of a protest against the sentence said, "This was, in my eyes, proof that the Judaism of love and compassion still lived and breathed even after the Holocaust" (145). Still, the newspaper *Maariv* expressed the dominant feeling: "A pardon for Eichmann? No! Six million times no!" (146). The Israeli state carried out the sentence on May 31, 1962.

The last chapter Lipstadt dedicates to a discussion of Hannah Arendt and the troubled legacy she has created for her reporting of the Eichmann trial in the *New Yorker*. Justifiably critical of Arendt's desire to have her *Origins of Totalitarianism* thesis—totalitarianism as enabler for genocide—fulfilled through Eichmann's testimony, Lipstadt does acknowledge a few positions taken by Arendt that historians have often ignored. For example, Arendt did argue that Israel was justified in its kidnapping and trial of Eichmann. Likewise, she supported the implementation of the death penalty for Eichmann. And she addressed Konrad Adenauer's "historical revisionism" in regard to postwar Germany. Still Lipstadt clearly points out Arendt's weaknesses such as habitual absenteeism from the courtroom, especially at key moments in the trial, and her tendency to plagiarize from the work of Raul Hilberg. Lipstadt concludes that Arendt's analysis of Eichmann truly was "strangely out of touch with the reality of his historical record" (69).

Together Lipstadt and Chatterley offer us two unique perspectives on Holocaust study. Lipstadt's work is easily accessible and offers an excellent, succinct overview of Eichmann's capture and trial. Along with pertinent use of trial transcripts, it brings together much of the secondary literature on this subject. It serves well both for general reading and for classroom

teaching. By contrast, Chatterley's work on Steiner, though engaging and accessible, will only primarily serve the specialist or a Steiner enthusiast.

–Kevin P. Spicer, C.S.C.

THE GAP BETWEEN "I" AND "WE"

Teshale Tibebu: *Hegel and the Third World: The Making of Eurocentrism in World History*. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011. Pp. xxviii, 409. $45.00.)

doi:10.1017/S0034670512000174

Teshale Tibebu's *Hegel and the Third World* is definitely not your standard account of this icon of Western philosophy. As I read it, I kept contrasting it with Herbert Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution*, C. L. R. James's *Notes on Dialectics*, and J. N. Findlay's *Hegel: A Reexamination*—three of the earliest commentaries on Hegel that I had read. As I turned the pages of Tibebu's book, the picture from these earlier readings began to fade. Emerging with great clarity and masterful documentation was the scale, depth, and other proportions of Hegel's Eurocentrism as I had never seen it before. As a result, for the first time I was forced to yield my image of Hegel as the master dialectician of the movement of universal Spirit and of the development of the "I" of self-consciousness. Tibebu's aim in this text is to show that "Hegel's philosophy fails to be a philosophy of genuine humanism or of concrete universalism" (331). In my view, he definitely succeeds in this undertaking.

Chapter 4, "Race, Class and Gender," initiates the break that sets this book apart from others. In this chapter, the author makes two crucial moves: first, he shows that Hegel philosophizes from multiple standpoints. As a result, the dialectical codes of the discourses of Spirit and of the "I" of self-consciousness are not always dominant, and as Hegel moves between his different standpoints he contradicts the universalistic principles of the above two founding discourses. Second, Tibebu abandons without rejecting the dominance of the interpretive codes of these two discourses and makes the codes of Hegel's historical, biological, and environmental discourses the crucial interpretive keys to his philosophy. These new interpretive codes give Tibebu direct access not to Hegel's Absolute or his "I" of individual self-consciousness, but to the "We" of the national or collective self-consciousness of Europeans. It is precisely the gaps between Hegel's treatment of the "I" and the "We" that is the focus of Tibebu's book.

In his treatment of the "I" of individual self-consciousness, Tibebu shows that Hegel opens it up to the full transforming power of Absolute Spirit.

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